The aim of this paper is to provide a critical view on the growing number of writings about the "crisis" in the OR/MS community. In contrast to most writings found in the OR/MS literature, however, this paper also considers articles from the Harvard Business Review, in order to provide a managerial perspective. Six main issues appearing in the debate are distinguished: the scientific versus technological nature of OR/MS, customer relations with users of OR/MS, the learning effect of an OR/MS study, tactical versus strategic importance of OR/MS, tool versus problem-orientation in OR/MS, and the interdisciplinary character of OR/MS. We believe that the problems signalled are due to a phenomenon of "natural drift" between the scientific and the technological natures of OR/MS, as a result of which some fundamental aspects of OR remain underdeveloped. Finding better ways of managing the natural drift is needed to turn the so-called crisis into an opportunity.
Introduction
It is not everyone that is born during a World War, pronounced dead at age 30, only to go through a mid-life crisis and be subject of a post mortem 14 years after, still sets out a plan for the next decade the following year and even has his or her existence proved another 4 years later as if nothing had happened. The single fact that the discipline known as Operational Research/ Management Science has pulled off this remarkable feat (Ackoff (1979a) , Lilien (1987) , Ackoff (1987) , CONDOR (1988) , and White (1991) respectively) is in itself sufficient reason to take a closer look at some much-discussed aspects of its development until the present day.
Particularly (though by no means exclusively) in recent years, the Operational Research/Management Science (OR/MS) literature has shown a growing interest in the history of the field, but also a growing concern about its future. Much has been written about the future of OR/MS, claiming that future to be bright, expressing some worries or simply stating that the future is past and that OR/MS is dead. Dando & Bennett (1981) note that the dominant feeling in the British OR community evolved from very optimistic in 1963, through optimistic in 1968 and unsure in 1973, to gloomy in 1978. Given that so much is written about the "current crisis in OR/MS", it is reasonable to ask to what extent this debate is truly justified. Surprisingly, writings on the "OR/MS crisis" generally show little or no awareness of opinions expressed in management literature. In this paper, we frequently refer to articles from the Harvard Business Review, being the management journal most read by executives, in an attempt to step outside this largely inwardlooking debate. Although the Harvard Business Review obviously cannot be representative of management attitudes in general, tracing its OR/MS articles provides some interesting insights.
To begin with, as Figure 1 shows, the "crisis" debate in the OR/MS literature took off soon after a dramatic drop in attention paid by HBR to OR/MS. A more superficial look through all issues of the Sloan Management Review reveals a similar pattern. However, a glance at recent editions of the journal Interfaces suffices to demonstrate that this decline in attention in general management journals does not coincide with a lack of relevant and highly successful applications of OR/MS.
A graph of sales of OR-based software may also show a very different picture than Figure 1 . We do not explicitly discuss the huge impact of the advent of computers, decision support systems, etc., on the discipline of OR/MS; it is surprising, however, that the drop in managerial attention has occurred despite the vastly enhanced implementation possibilities these developments offer. Research, the graph includes all papers expressing concerns similar to those raised here and those explicitly referring to the "crisis". Only JORS and OR are included, as hardly any "philosophically" oriented papers have appeared in
Management Science since the early 1970s, and the other major OR/MS journals were founded considerably later than the two considered here. Including these relatively new journals would inevitably reinforce the above pattern.
Obviously, this graph should not be taken too literally, but the overall picture remains suggestive. Remark that, as discussed later, it was in 1973 and more viciously in 1979, that Ackoff pronounced OR/MS dead.
Figure 1: Publication trends
The aim of this paper is to identify the main issues in the OR/MS debate, also taking into consideration the views expressed in HBR. We try to explain, in a simple way, a natural underlying cause of the development of OR/MS and the surrounding debate. The key hypothesis is outlined in Section 2, while Section 3 is devoted to a systematic but necessarily far from complete discussion of the different viewpoints found with respect to the main issues distinguished. Section 4 contains an attempt to draw the threads of Section 3 together again and to formulate some conclusions.
2 the applied sciences, and, in turn, indicate to applied scientists which areas still need developing.
Ideally, "engineers" will have sufficient knowledge of (several) applied sciences to know which approach to use for any problem they encounter, combined with a thorough knowledge of that specific approach in order to be able to apply it. They should also have a deep understanding of the real world, i.e. of how problems are embedded in complex environments.
Natural causes, such as the separation of industry and academia, and the division of institutes into more or less narrowly specialised departments with imperfect internal communication, usually lead the above figure to appear more like
AS BD real world academia
Rather than forming a continuum with free movement of people and ideas, different domains are separated from one another but remain somehow connected. The connections are partly institutional since, for instance, students formed in academic institutes end up working in industry.
It is partly accidental since, for instance, some practitioner or consultant may turn to a friend in academia for help with a tough problem. Let us look at these connections as springs, holding the system together. This situation is not serious in itself, as long as the tension in the connecting springs keeps the system balanced. However, again for many natural and obvious reasons such as the difference in dominant orientation and the different types of people employed in both realms, the system can easily be pulled out of equilibrium. Of course, the limited interaction between industry and academia reinforces this natural drift. Another reason to call this drift a natural oup relates to the maturity of the field. It is quite natural for a maturing field to deepen its roots by shifting towards basic disciplines (more and more OR groups can be found in computer science or pure math departments). On the other extreme of the spectrum early techniques like linear programming become public knowledge in that they are no longer the province of OR staff groups in industry, but simply another useful internal operational tool for many groups in the company (like calculus or regression analysis). It is clear that the above effects will make the tension in some connecting springs higher than in others, causing a natural drift toward the following situation:
To bring the discussion back to OR/MS, we limit the "real world" to managerial problems (in a very broad sense of the word), and consequently replace "engineers" and "applied scientists" by eventually of value to the problem-oriented management engineers and managers".
The main objectives of "management engineers" are to help managers understand the situation they are facing and/or to provide answers to specific questions, which are not solvable by standard means, by using an analytical approach. In general the aim is to eliminate unintended irrational decisions and actions and to give the eventual decision a more "scientific" character. Dawes (1988) provides an excellent discussion of how even highly trained professionals frequently and unintentionally make errors of judgement, exposing them to systematic exploitation by others who have succeeded in banishing such irrational judgements. This is not to say that there is no room left for intuition in management. On the contrary, one aim of "management engineering"
is to increase managers' understanding and thereby sharpen their intnition, eliminating irrational elements.
A "management engineer" studies the situation from an analytical point of view. Let us reiterate at this point that the "crisis" in the OR/MS community is not due to the amount of attention paid to the theoretical, mathematical side of the field, but rather to a relative shortage of fundamentally novel approaches and applications, such as should arise from the domain of "management engineering". Note, also, that it is not uncommon to consider the domain of "Operations Research" as extending further than we have done here, to include at least part of both "management engineering" and "management science". Because not all authors discussed here mean the same thing when using the expressions OR and MS, the terminology in this paper is inevitably somewhat confusing. Our aim here is definitely not to provide normative statements concerning the "true" meaning of the terms OR and MS, but simply to point out an area (the one we have labelled "management engineering") that in our view is not developing as rapidly as it should and, as such, is at the root of the current sense of crisis.
The debate
This Section contains a systematic discussion of a selection of writings in the OR/MS debate, comprising both early and recent articles in the OR/MS literature and articles from the Harvard Business Review. In order to distinguish opinions from the OR/MS literature from those found in HBR, most of the references in the text include a mention of the journal involved. We focus on six main issues of the debate. The fundamental issue is. in our view:
• whether OR is a knowledge-oriented science or a problem-oriented technology.
The five other issues distinguished are each derived from this basic issue. They are:
• customer relations with users of OR/MS;
• the learning effect of an OR/MS study;
• the relevance of OR/MS at a strategic level;
• tool-orientation versus problem-orientation in OR/MS;
• the interdisciplinary nature of OR/MS.
A separate section is devoted to each of these issues.
Science or technology?
The fundamental issue in the "crisis" debate in the OR/MS literature is that of orientation of the field; all other issues boil down to the question whether OR/MS should be primarily a knowledgeoriented science or a problem-oriented technology. In the previous Section we argued that both orientations are needed for survival and growth of OR and MS. For example, research into interior point methods for speeding up Linear Programming may sometimes be purely mathematical in nature, but is of great relevance for "management engineers" when suitably implemented into novel software, and therefore an important contribution to "management science". On the other hand,
developing an enormous LP model for a particular refinery and then implementing the fastest available LP code is a typical case of "management engineering", and signals to "management science" that there is a need for extremely fast LP codes. It is our belief that the "crisis" is partly a result of workers of both types not acknowledging the necessity and the achievements of those of the other type, and therefore not letting developments at one end be a guideline for development efforts at the other. This lack of mutual appreciation is particularly serious for workers who stand with one foot on either side of the divide. Precisely these valuable people, who could help in bridging the gap, are often the ones who fall between the cracks.
The problem of the split identity of OR/MS was already noted by Herrmann & Magee (HBR, 1953; p. 111): "As an applied science, the work is torn between two objectives: as "applied" it strives for practical and useful work; as "science" it seeks increasing understanding of the basic operation, even when the usefulness of this information is not immediately clear." Flood (MS.
1955), quoted above, also clearly recognised this distinction. Symonds (MS, 1957; p. 126) it is quite easy to establish that the majority of the operations researchers best known in the field are openly proud of their learned papers and almost apologetic when referring to applications."
Fierce criticisms of the neglect of real-world aspects of OR are given by Woolsey (OR, 1972) and some well-known "OR is dead" papers by Ackoff (OR, 1973; JORS, 1979a JORS, ,1979b . Morse (OR, 1977) , one of the first Presidents of the Operations Research Society of America, signals a trend away from the real world (p. 188): "But if we stick to our original aim of matching our models to reality, rather than trying to make reality fit the preferred model, we can contribute in important ways to many of the serious problems facing this country and the world."
Datido k Sharp (JORS, 197R) argue that OR was and should rel urn to being a ethnology. drawing on a broad scientific basis; it is not a science in itself. Williams (1986) sees the relationship between OR and economics as being that between engineering and physics. Somewhat more extreme is Eilon (OMEGA, 1984; p. 106; also 1987) : "Others will prefer to keep conventional OR as it is and to uphold the claim that it should emulate, as far as possible, the generally accepted norms of behaviour expected from scientists. The argument advanced in this paper is that such a stance is no longer adequate and that we should accept the proposed role of the change-agent, with everything that it entails."
In the early 1980s, the British Operational Research Society established the "Commission on the 
Customer relations
An issue strongly related to that of dominant orientation, but specifically relevant for applied OR/MS, is that of problems in customer relations. Here we look at three aspects of this issue:
• the frequently recurring theme of communication problems between OR analysts and managers;
• the need for better public relations (PR for OR) and the name of the discipline;
• the need for better understanding of customers' expectations of OR. (HBR, 1979) , on the other hand, is less euphoric (p. 154): "The modus operandi of the operations researcher is to abstract from some real-world problem a mathematical problem for which he can find an answer. He then touts that answer as a guidepost to the manager." The ongoing debate shows that the OR/MS community is aware of this problem.
The image of OR/MS
One result has been to call the name of the field into question. Recall that Flood (MS, 1955) already used the term "management engineers", at a time when there was no particular reason not to use the term "operations researchers". The very first paragraph of Wagner's (1975) well-known textbook discusses why the name operations research is ambiguous and unfortunate. Lilien's (INT, 1987) "mid-life crisis" paper observes that (p. 36) "the term operations research has developed a somewhat negative connotation in the late '60s and early '70s. According to the panel, the term management science is seen by many managers as a contradiction in terms; managers know that much of what they do is messy, ill-structured, based on poor or biased data, and in need of almost instant resolution." As a possible remedy, he mentions a suggestion by G. Hoffman to use the term "management engineering" for the discipline of MS/OR. The Report of the UK Commission also recognises the problem (p. 854): "An extreme but widely held view-conceivably as many as half OR practitioners hold it-is that the phrase 'operational research' is now understood by clients in so narrow a way, and in a way so unrelated to the actuality of OR in practice, that some new name should be found." The reason for not actually recommending a change of name is that the Commission could not agree upon a suitable replacement. And Weingartner (OR, 1987;  p. 259): "The view is growing in acceptance; the name of the field, and the name of the society that champions it, ought to be changed." It is not without reason that, in this paper, we make as much use as possible of the term "management engineering", although it is of course not without drawbacks.
Rinnooy Kan (E,TOR, 1989) sees better visibility of the discipline ("PR for OR", p. 283) as the solution to the image problem. A powerful argument in favour of applying OR /MS is the continuous narrowing of profit margins due to fierce global competition. Reducing manufacturing costs by 1%, or increasing delivery reliability by 1%, can make all the difference. One particular strength of OR/MS studies is the ability to expose unnecessary costs and to streamline operations, and even if the change is only marginal percentage-wise, it can prove a highly lucrative or even essential investment. A sense of urgency, such as an attempt to survive, is noted by Telgen (1988) as a necessary condition for OR to be appropriate.
What does the customer really want?
Despite the repeated appeal in the OR/MS literature for more attention to applications, little fundamental knowledge on the process of an OR study is available. Case studies found in literature rarely describe the actual development of the project. A very basic question is how an OR study can be made to meet the customer's wishes. In the next Section we see that OR studies can provide anything between clear answers to specific questions and an increase in the customer's understanding of his/her situation. Naturally, the entire organisation of the project should hinge on whether the customer expects to receive a "black box" computer program with some efficient problem-solving algorithms, or whether he/she expects to gain more insight into his/her operations.
A useful concept, in Fortuin, van Beek & Van Wassenhove (1989) , is the "OR cycle", describing the phases a typical OR study would go through: from realisation that there is a problem to problem description, model building and data gathering, selection of a solution method, validation, and, finally, implementation. However, they remark that the OR study may have solved the wrong HBR, 1970) remarks about OR teams not understanding the problem), and that the problem may have changed during the study, so that the implemented solution must be contrasted with the current problem, and, if necessary, the cycle must be passed through again.
The customer must not only obtain the desired benefits from the OR study, i.e. it must meet his quality requirements; it must also do so within the specified budget and time limit. As time-based competition is becoming increasingly important in business, OR studies should attempt to keep up with this trend and produce the desired results faster. This is obviously incompatible with repeated time-consuming iterations through the OR cycle, so the two types of errors distinguished above must be avoided, by speeding up the OR process and by improving the problem definition stage. Whereas the danger of the problem having changed is reduced by the speeding up, the danger of solving the wrong problem remains. Errors of this sort will normally occur during the steps involving problem description and model building, and can be avoided through more frequent and better communication with the customer; Brown (HBR, 1970) too recognises the danger in the "arms'-length approach" (p. 86) which he considers characteristic of much OR. "34. The Commission found significant amounts of O.R. in practice with one or more of the following aims:
• to help structure 'messes' or messy problems;
• to research into the facts of an uncertain topic;
• to help an understanding of a sphere of activity; [.. .] In this sense, the results that "quantitative people" have produced are beginning to contribute in a really significant way to the art of management."
According to Brown (HBR, 1970) , the main benefits of decision theory analysis are not the nuinerical results, but the fact that it clarifies the relevant issues, makes implicit assumptions explicit, and provides a framework for communication. Boulden Buffa (HBR, 1970) conclude that (p.
Ra) "Decision making is facilitated because the manager interacts with the model, not heenlie decision-making logic is built into the model itself." In Jones's (HBR, 1970) words (p. 78): "In business decision making, "getting there is more than half the fun." Thus many discussions of attempts to apply new mathematical methods to solving business problems end up with the conclusion that the real benefit was not the specific answer but the increased awareness of organizational problems and opportunities. This was achieved through the discipline of formulating the problem in a new vocabulary and structure." Geoffrion (HBR, 1976) too defends the use of OR by arguing that computer models can deepen managers' insights.
Ackoff (JORS, 1979b; p. 189) Reading these comments, it is hard to escape the feeling that the OR/MS community has failed to adequately recognise how it could be of greatest value to managers, and it seems high time to develop in detail the implications of these remarks for applied OR. One approach attempting to fill this need is the systems approach, as described by e.g. Checkland (1981) . He sees traditional OR/MS, or "hard systems thinking", as a special case of "soft systems thinking"; in the latter, the emphasis is on accepting different existing views of reality (or "Weltanschauung") in order to increase understanding of the behaviour of the system concerned. Clearly, the preciseness or "hardness" of the methodology to be employed in any situation is limited by the preciseness of the problem definition; in many cases, a combination of "soft" and "hard" approaches may be necessary to achieve the best results. Jackson (JORS, 1987) argues that accepting such different approaches, not necessarily "hard", as essential parts of management science, is essential for the discipline to survive in the long run. This will mean lost opportunities for OR professionals to work on interesting issues, and less visibility for operations research with corporate and government top management." Naturally, the emphasis found in HBR on the learning effect of OR indicates that those authors believed that OR is a valuable support in strategic decision-making; after all, for "simple", operational decisions, insight and understanding are less relevant. As an aside, one might feel that if the discipline intends to play a larger role in strategic decisions, the name "operational research"
OR/MS at the strategic level
is not so fortunate.
3.5 The rule of the tool, or managing messes?
Originally, OR was entirely oriented towards real-world problems, but then at that time there simply were no "OR tools". In the early days, there was a rush to develop the much-needed tools, and that this development has been extremely successful cannot be disputed, as is demonstrated by the wealth of techniques OR workers currently have at their disposal. However, many of the contributers to the OR/MS debate seem to think that the focus has shifted too far towards "Analysis in Wonderland", and away from the real world; the discipline would have neglected (EJOR, 1987; p. 271) concludes that "the adaptive OR group itself has proved to be the most enduring and useful 'tool' of all."
In his "OR, a Post Mortem", Ackoff (OR, 1987) pushes his discussion of tool versus problem orientation further. To these two categories, which he calls input and output orientation respectively, he adds the category of market orientation, meaning that a discipline is defined in terms of the class of users addressed, rather than the tools used (inputs) or the problems that can be solved (outputs). He then claims that OR was originally a market-oriented profession, but became output-oriented during the early 1960s, and is nowadays even input-oriented. P. 474: "The field's introversion drove it into a catatonic state in which it died mercifully, but it has yet to be buried."
Although Ackoff's views are not uncontroversial, he does seem to describe a natural drift-type phenomenon and the potential fatal outcome.
A much more tool-oriented impression is given by the USA Commission (OR, CONDOR, 1988), whose report focusses on past and future development of tools, and by Hansen (EJOR, 1989) , who argues that there is no crisis in OR, pointing to the undisputably successful development of many new techniques as evidence.
Many of the criticisms claim that OR/MS tends to abstract too much from real-world problems, in order to allow more analytical sophistry. The general (though not universal) warning against letting tools become the dominant orientation in OR/MS (the rule of the tool) seems justified, as this requires that potential customers are familiar with the OR/MS toolbox in order to decide whether or not to commission an OR study. This way, OR/MS teams will only receive projects for which they already have the tools, thereby limiting growth opportunities for OR/MS in both theoretical and practical directions.
Of course, the importance of tools should not be underestimated either: the profession would never have got very far without them, nor will it get much further without continuous development of new tools. Weingartner (OR, 1987) signals that researchers will no longer consider individual problems as being independent of each other, but attempt to develop solutions that can be used more than once. This development of general tools is necessary; designers, for example, also use general tools to create a unique design. Theoretically relatively under-researched areas are problem description and model building, as Zimmermann (1985) states: "The contents and scope of operations research has been described and defined in many different ways. Most of the people working in operations research will agree, however, that the modelling of problem situations and the search for optimal solutions to these models are undoubtedly important parts of it. The latter activity is more algorithmic, mathematical, or formal in character. 
The interdisciplinary character of OR/MS
When OR emerged during World War II, there were obviously no specially trained "OR workers"; the field was inherently interdisciplinary, uniting scientists from diverse disciplines. Recalling our earlier definition of "management engineering", it is clear that very few individuals can hope to meet all those requirements; interdisciplinar y teams are therefore a prerequisite. Being at the heart of OR/MS, the question of interdisciplinarity has received much attention in the debate.
A mathematical approach, whether this means using mathematical (but not necessarily sophisticated) techniques or simply an analytical style, is an essential characteristic of OR/MS, but it is precisely the dominance of mathematics over other disciplines that has attracted much criticism.
It is by no means the case that every single individual in the OR/MS community should be inter- (who else will pay?). We believe that the discipline can and should fight harder, and hope that this paper has identified some of the main areas towards which our efforts should be directed. Having illustrated the natural drift phenomenon above by systematically discussing various viewpoints on OR/MS, we can draw several conclusions.
First, one could perhaps think of the sense of crisis as if it were caused by OR/MS "reaching the next stage in the product life-cycle", gradually changing from a highly innovative approach to a more mature management tool. In doing so, its members are finding the boundaries of the field, inevitably leading to some disillusionment. However, this does not constitute failure, but is a consequence of success. Analogously, one might ask whether alchemists, despite having laid part of the basis of chemistry, failed just because they never managed to produce gold?
Second, any individual in the OR/MS world is at liberty to choose where in the six-dimensional space defined by the six main issues distinguished above to position him/herself, but the field as a whole must take care not to stray from an acceptable balance of orientations. The area of "management engineering" seems relatively underpopulated, both in terms of people and in terms of theory. Not all current practical OR work would be considered as "worthy of OR" by the rest of the community. Theoretical work in OR seems to have shifted towards "management science", leaving the middle ground of "management engineering" underdeveloped. The existence of different paradigms within the OR/MS world should be recognised by the professional societies, and each paradigm should be catered for and its development stimulated. While a separation of paradigms into distinct fields (with their own societies) is potentially harmful, mutual acceptance is a must. The impression imposes itself that, in Great Britain, the Operational Research Society is closer to "management engineering" than the Operations Research Society of America, which lies further towards the basic disciplines. The desirability of a shift towards the British model is currently being debated within the Dutch OR Society.
Third, education. We have not treated this as a separate point here, but much has been written about the role of education in the current "crisis". Education in OR is in general a largely academic affair, and therefore perhaps not perfectly balanced with respect to the main issues discussed. A key problem is that it is not always clear whether students are being trained to be researchers in "management science" or practitioners in the real world; the type of education needed in both cases is too different to be combined in one curriculum.
Fourth, some areas in need of research can be identified, all typical fundamental aspects of "management engineering". The need to better understand the process by which managers can learn from an OR study has been mentioned above. It is equally important to know more about customers' expectations of OR studies and how these can best be met. Empirical research investigating factors influencing success of OR projects, such as Tilanus (EJOR, 1985) , can be valuable, but is not very widespread. The importance of research into the art of modelling has been noted by Mitchell (1973) and Zimmermann (1985) . In short, the foundations need to be laid to arrive at a "methodology of management engineering".
Finally, the formulation of the natural drift hypothesis implies that a similar phenomenon can occur in all branches of science. A natural question is then to ask whether they are all undergoing a crisis. It would be interesting to know how they are coping with their "natural drifts", and who is responsible for their success or failure to do so. In the case of OR/MS, managers have no incentive, time or money to tackle the problem, and experience suggests that the academic community is not ideally placed to do so either. Maybe we should be looking for an "Operational Research Competitiveness Action" (ORCA), in the form of an international cooperation between academia, industry, the professional societies, and governments, who together can provide the people, the problems, the publicity and the funding needed.
To conclude, we repeat that natural forces operate to cause the natural drift described in Section 2. Where these forces have left OR/MS has been outlined in Section 3, from which it is impossible to emerge feeling that all is well. However, nearly all the problems mentioned can be avoided if ways are found to manage the natural drift; by clarifying, accepting, and exploiting the differences in orientation that exist and hopefully always will exist within the OR/MS community. The future of OR/MS is neither bright nor past, it is simply ours to shape. 
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